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Steven S. Nam* 
ABSTRACT:    
The Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914 (“FTC Act”), a model for 
many other countries that set up their own competition agencies, combines 
the control afforded by presidential appointment and removal powers over 
FTC commissioners with an exceedingly discretionary mandate.  This 
Article contends that the FTC Act’s outmoded openness to strong 
presidential direction, where adapted abroad, has helped detract from 
antitrust regulator independence.  Even advanced players in the liberal 
international economic order such as South Korea have made use of the 
United States’ original blueprint for unitary executive-stamped antitrust 
enforcement without sharing a long historical evolution of counterbalancing 
regulatory norms, e.g. the judicial check that was Humphrey’s Executor v. 
United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935). 
Strong executive direction in antitrust enforcement is particularly suited 
to capitalist economies helmed by administrations with mercantilist policies, 
given their belief that the state and big business must cooperate in the face 
of zero-sum international competition.  South Korean President Lee Myung-
Bak’s term (2008-2013) serves as an apt recent case study, featuring dirigiste 
calibration of antitrust enforcement against a backdrop of global recession.  
This Article examines the parallels between the FTC Act and the South 
Korean Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (“MRFTA”) before 
scrutinizing the enabled silo-like enforcement patterns of the Korean Fair 
Trade Commission under the Lee administration.  Increasingly widespread 
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erosion of public confidence in free and competitive trade demands a better 
understanding of the forces preventing global convergence in antitrust 
enforcement, and of their roots. 
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We have created, in the Federal Trade Commission, a means of 
inquiry and of accommodation in the field of commerce which 
ought both to coordinate the enterprises of our traders and 
manufacturers and to remove the barriers of misunderstanding and 
of a too technical interpretation of the law. 




[Our companies] are fighting with unfavorable conditions amid 
competition in the global economy.  To do so, they must be 
allowed to escape various regulations.  Let’s take just a half step 
forward to move beyond the pace of change in the global economy. 
 —South Korean President Lee Myung-Bak, March 20082 
 
It is clear that, at the beginning of the 21st century, we cannot 
afford to operate, to enforce our competition laws, in national or 
regional silos.  We must not remain isolated from what happens in 
other jurisdictions.  Even if markets often remain regional or 
national in terms of competitive assessment, fostering global 
convergence in our legal and economic analysis is essential to 
ensuring effectiveness of our enforcement and creating a level 
 
 1.  PRESIDENT WILSON’S STATE PAPERS AND ADDRESSES 315-316 (Albert Shaw, ed., The 
Review of Reviews Co.) (1918). 
 2.  Anti-trust trade commission unveils plan to ease regulations for conglomerates, THE 
HANKYOREH (Mar. 29, 2008), http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_business/2787
44.html [https://perma.cc/6AA3-EN4E]. 
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playing field for businesses across our jurisdictions. 
 —Joaquín Almunia, Vice-President of the European Commission for 
Competition Policy, April 20103 
 
The [U.S.] Agencies do not discriminate in the enforcement of the 
antitrust laws on the basis of the nationality of the parties.  Nor do 
the Agencies employ their statutory authority to further non-
antitrust goals. 
 —The U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade 
Commission, April 19954 
INTRODUCTION 
The International Competition Network’s founding in October 2001, 
with the aim of “formulat[ing] proposals for procedural and substantive 
convergence” among its stated goals,5 sought to usher in a future with more 
cosmopolitan and coherent global antitrust enforcement.  Although U.S. 
regulatory leadership maintained that “consistently sound antitrust 
enforcement policy cannot be defined and decreed for others by the U.S., the 
EU, or anyone else,” many countries looked to the U.S. as a role model while 
developing their competition regimes.6  It is ironic, then, that to this day a 
central obstacle to the aspired international “culture of competition” can be 
found in none other than the influence of the U.S.’s own FTC Act.7  
American antitrust priorities around the time of the legislation’s passage 
oscillated between tempering trusts and shepherding business to further 
national economic strength, all towards the domestic interest.  They shaped 
a regulatory environment that would reemerge abroad in many later-
 
 3.  Cooperation and convergence: competition policy in the 21st century, speech at the 
International Competition Network Annual Conference (Apr. 27, 2010) available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-10-183_en.htm [https://perma.cc/PKL8-QT5
D].  
 4.  DEP’T OF JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES FOR 
INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS (Apr. 1995), available at https://www.justice.gov/atr/antitrust-
enforcement-guidelines-international-operations [https://perma.cc/6493-TTDN] (last update
d Aug. 8, 2016). 
 5.  INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION NETWORK, http://www.internationalcompetitionn
etwork.org [https://perma.cc/NB5G-HLQQ] (last visited Oct. 22, 2017). 
 6.  William J. Kolasky, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen. of the Dep’t of Just., U.S. and EU 
Competition Policy: Cartels, Mergers, and Beyond, Address Before the Council for the Uni
ted States and Italy Bi-Annual Conference (Jan. 25, 2002), available at https://www.justice
.gov/atr/speech/us-and-eu-competition-policy-cartels-mergers-and-beyond 
[https://perma.cc/H4RN-ZT2K] (last visited on Oct. 22, 2017). 
 7.  15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1914). 
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developing countries. 
The deepening global retreat from internationalism and free market 
principles in the present day, with the specter of trade wars looming, is 
exacerbated by nationalist competition regimes that are derivative of a U.S. 
model predating the modern world economy.  Domestic critics of open 
markets often overlook the U.S.’s own past vis-à-vis protectionist 
governments today.  Illiberal or nominally liberal, they walk the kind of 
dirigiste path once treaded by the American School through the early 
twentieth century.8  In and of itself, pure economic liberalism does not create 
biased regulatory forces that imbalance “open door” trade policies; they are 
largely the product of politics.  An antecedent of today’s national antitrust 
silo can be traced back to the U.S. political climate leading up to the FTC 
Act’s passage. 
Beneath his trustbuster image long perpetuated in mainstream 
discourse,9 President Theodore Roosevelt harbored more nuanced beliefs 
regarding competition enforcement.  They proved consistent with a 
nationalistic streak exhibited since the publication of his earliest book, a 
naval military history depicting the U.S. as a resourceful underdog.10  During 
his presidency, Roosevelt formed the first antitrust-focused office within the 
Department of Justice (“DOJ”),11 and a Bureau of Corporations within the 
newly established Department of Commerce and Labor.12  He used these two 
prototype enforcement agencies as his big sticks for holding accountable 
corporations which had better “show that they have a right to exist.”13  Yet 
Roosevelt also faulted the Sherman Act’s nascent application for preventing 
businesses from working to their potential under modern business 
 
 8.  See generally MICHAEL LIND, HAMILTON’S REPUBLIC: READINGS IN THE AMERICAN 
NATIONALIST TRADITION (1997) (documenting the early manifestations of nationalism 
theory). 
 9.  See, e.g., Special Report: The Rise of the Superstars, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 17, 
2016, at 3 (painting a picture of Theodor Roosevelt as determined to stop a handful of 
corporations from taking control of the American economy).   
 10.  See LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, RESPECTFULLY QUOTED: A DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 
346 (2010) quoted in THEODORE ROOSEVELT, THE NAVAL WAR OF 1812 (1882) (singling out 
the U.S. naval war hero Commodore Stephen Decatur for praise).  This Article’s title partly 
derives from Decatur’s famed if controversial toast: “Our country—in her intercourse with 
foreign nations, may she always be in the right, and always successful, right or wrong.” Id. 
 11.  DEP’T OF JUST., HISTORY OF THE ANTITRUST DIVISION, https://www.justice. gov/atr
/history-antitrust-division [https://perma.cc/6ST8-CZEE] (last visited July 29, 2017). 
 12.  FED. TRADE COMM’N, OUR HISTORY, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/our-history 
[https://perma.cc/JEY3-ZLSB] (last visited July 29, 2017). 
 13.  Theodore Roosevelt, Special Message (Apr. 27, 1908), in 16 A COMPILATION OF THE 
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 7189, 7193 (James D. Richardson ed., 1927). 
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conditions.14  Even the leviathan trusts, after all, were American trusts.  He 
stressed the importance of protecting the country’s global competitiveness 
and voiced his opposition to a blanket prohibition on questionable 
combinations and concentration.  Instead, he preferred oversight and 
control.15  According to the former Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) 
attorney and historian Marc Winerman, Roosevelt wanted to “use a 
commission to supplement (or supersede) antitrust,” while the firm “that 
‘voluntarily’ accepted its regulation and obeyed [government] orders in good 
faith would be shielded from antitrust prosecution.”16  Consistent with 
Roosevelt’s regulatory hedging and predilection for strong executive control, 
President Woodrow Wilson in 1914 signed into law the Federal Trade 
Commission Act (“FTC Act”) that established the FTC.  Wilson underscored 
 
 14.   
The mechanism of modern business is so delicate that extreme care must be taken 
not to interfere with it in a spirit of rashness or ignorance. Many of those who 
have made it their vocation to denounce the great industrial combinations which 
are popularly, although with technical inaccuracy, known as “trusts,” appeal 
especially to hatred and fear . . . In facing new industrial conditions, the whole 
history of the world shows that legislation will generally be both unwise and 
ineffective unless undertaken after calm inquiry and with sober self-restraint. 
Much of the legislation directed at the trusts would have been exceedingly 
mischievous had it not also been entirely ineffective . . . In dealing with business 
interests, for the Government to undertake by crude and ill-considered legislation 
to do what may turn out to be bad, would be to incur the risk of such far-reaching 
national disaster that it would be preferable to undertake nothing at all 
Theodore Roosevelt, 1901 Annual Message to Congress, in 15 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE 
PRESIDENTS, 6641, 6647 (James D. Richardson ed., 1917).  
 15.  
There is a widespread conviction in the minds of the American people that the 
great corporations known as trusts are in certain of their features and tendencies 
hurtful to the general welfare. This springs from no spirit of envy or 
uncharitableness, nor lack of pride in the great industrial achievements that have 
placed this country at the head of the nations struggling for commercial 
supremacy. It does not rest upon a lack of intelligent appreciation of the necessity 
of meeting changing and changed conditions of trade with new methods, nor upon 
ignorance of the fact that combination of capital in the effort to accomplish great 
things is necessary when the world’s progress demands that great things be done. 
It is based upon sincere conviction that combination and concentration should be, 
not prohibited, but supervised and within reasonable limits controlled; and in my 
judgment this conviction is right. 
Roosevelt, supra note 14, at 6647, 6648. 
 16.  Marc Winerman, The Origins of the FTC: Concentration, Cooperation, Control, and 
Competition, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 24 (2003). See also id. at 3 (“Roosevelt envisioned an 
expanded Bureau of Corporations that would rationalize the economy, tame rather than 
dissolve the trusts, and accommodate rather than challenge both concentration and interfirm 
cooperation. All this would take place under government auspices, and the government’s 
ultimate backstop would be direct price regulation.”). 
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his desire for the agency to be transparent and accountable to him, with 
“powers of guidance and accommodation” meant to relieve “businessmen of 
unfounded fears and set them on the road of hopeful and confident 
enterprise.”17 
There is little evidence to suggest that either presidents or their 
legislative allies in the early twentieth century could have foreseen the 
ramifications of their formative roles in shaping competition regimes 
worldwide.  American competition laws, including the FTC Act, came to 
serve as a template for foreign governments that freely transplanted many 
elements while modifying others.  A cognizant DOJ and FTC issued their 
Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations in 1995, 
stating: “Throughout the world, the importance of antitrust law as a means 
to ensure open and free markets, protect consumers, and prevent conduct that 
impedes competition is becoming more apparent.”18  But these guidelines do 
not paint the full picture.  Inspired foreign states modeled their regulatory 
regimes after foundations originally shaped under the auspices of Roosevelt 
and Wilson, both powerful executives with aforementioned hands-on 
preferences in matters of antitrust.  At the FTC’s launch, “Wilson 
emphasized assistance to business rather than the investigative functions 
highlighted in the House or the prosecutorial functions highlighted in the 
Senate.”19  The language of the U.S. antitrust laws inevitably allowed leeway 
for presidential influence on industry-level economic direction. 
All the same, the enforcers of old were watchmen for a U.S. economy 
which, then as now, operated within a market economy framework.  Many 
countries that followed the United States’ regulatory lead have been less 
beholden.  As the prominent international relations scholar Michael W. 
Doyle confirms: 
The most striking rates of growth of the post-war period appear to 
have been achieved by the semi-planned capitalist economies of 
East Asia—Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, Japan, and now 
China and India. Indicative planning, capital rationing by para-
statal development banks and ministries of finance, managed 
trade, and incorporated unions—capitalist syndicalism, not 
capitalist libertarianism—seemed to describe the wave of the 
 
 17.  THE PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON 129 (Arthur S. Link ed., Princeton U. Press) 
(1982). See also ROBERT E. CUSHMAN, THE INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONS 681 
(1941) quoted in MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT 
COMMISSION 110 (2015) (“There is no doubt that Wilson . . . felt that he was entitled to 
impress his policies on the independent commissions and to expect their conformity to those 
policies.”). 
 18.  DEP’T OF JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 4. 
 19.  Winerman, supra note 16, at 5. 
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capitalist future.20 
The close coordination between government and big business common 
to state-sponsored capitalist economies is also conducive to mercantilist 
thinking and dependent on the incumbent administration’s economic 
worldview.  Originating from a “historical association with the desire of 
nation-states for a trade surplus. . . whether it is labeled economic 
nationalism, protectionism,”21 or the like today, mercantilism is 
characterized by the subservience of economy to the state and its interests, 
and a willingness to give home-grown business enterprises an extra 
competitive advantage.22  Thus-inclined governments view international 
economic relations as conflicting, zero-sum, and better overseen through 
state-private sector coordination than left to wholly free markets.23  Nor is 
the mercantilist phenomenon limited to illiberal states that feature state-
owned enterprises and other such overtly hybrid forms of corporate 
governance.  As political leaders continue to promote economic growth and 
highlight personal expertise to justify and fortify their democratic 
legitimacy, an expansion of governments’ coordination with the private 
sector has followed.24  When their major industries face dismal market 
conditions, countries inured to “capitalist syndicalism” per Doyle are not 
above protectionist adjustments at the expense of their neighbors.  Together 
with the standard mercantilist strategies of prioritizing exports and frequent 
 
 20.  Michael W. Doyle, Liberalism and Foreign Policy, in FOREIGN POLICY: THEORIES, 
ACTORS, CASES 54, 74 (Steve Smith et al. eds., 2012). 
 21.  Robert Gilpin, The Nature of Political Economy, in INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: 
ENDURING CONCEPTS AND CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 273, 281 (Robert J. Art & Robert Jervis 
eds., 2000). 
 22.  See, e.g., Spencer W. Walker, The Ambivalence of United States Antitrust Policy 
Towards Single-Country Export Cartels, 10 NW. J. INT’L L.& BUS. 98, 100 (1989) 
(highlighting the United States’ often protectionist antitrust policy).   
 23.  See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Sovereign Wealth Funds and 
Corporate Governance: A Minimalist Response to the New Mercantilism, 60 STAN. L. REV. 
1345, 1346 (2008) (“In [new mercantilism], the country is the unit whose value is to be 
maximized, with a corresponding increase in the role of the national government as a direct 
participant in and coordinator of the effort. . . For the new mercantile capitalism, the 
government attempts to ensure that company-level behavior results in country-level 
maximization of economic, social, and political benefits.”). 
 24.  See generally Christopher May, GLOBAL CORPORATIONS IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 
(2015) (arguing that corporations significantly impact global governance institutions); see 
also, Michael A. Witt, South Korea: Plutocratic State-Led Capitalism Reconfiguring, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ASIAN BUSINESS SYSTEMS 216, 221 (Michael A. Witt & Gordon 
Redding eds., 2014) (“The genuine fear that full enforcement of corporate governance reforms 
may weaken the competitive power of the chaebol [mega-conglomerates]; given their 
importance to the economy—Samsung alone is said to account for about 20 percent of Korean 
exports—it seems plausible that prosecutors and politicians will try to avoid the risk of blame 
for weakening Korea’s industrial powerhouses.”). 
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use of various non-tariff barriers to thwart competitive imports,25 selective 
antitrust enforcement offers another tool. 
This Article contends that the FTC Act’s outmoded openness to strong 
presidential direction, where adapted abroad, has helped detract from 
antitrust regulator independence.  Even advanced players in the liberal 
international economic order such as South Korea have made use of the 
United States’ original blueprint for unitary executive-stamped antitrust 
enforcement without sharing its long historical evolution of 
counterbalancing regulatory norms.  Strong executive direction in antitrust 
enforcement is particularly suited to capitalist economies helmed by 
administrations with mercantilist policies, given their belief that the state and 
big business must cooperate in the face of zero-sum international 
competition.  South Korean President Lee Myung-Bak’s term (2008-2013) 
serves as an apt recent case study, featuring dirigiste calibration of antitrust 
enforcement against a backdrop of global recession.  This Article examines 
the parallels between the FTC Act and the South Korean Monopoly 
Regulation and Fair Trade Act (“MRFTA”) before scrutinizing the enabled 
silo-like enforcement patterns of the Korean Fair Trade Commission under 
the Lee administration.  Increasingly widespread erosion of public 
confidence in free and competitive trade demands a better understanding of 
the forces preventing global convergence in antitrust enforcement, and of 
their roots. 
I.      DEFERENCE IN THE FTC ACT AND ITS MODERN PROGENY 
This Section reviews the FTC Act’s language, specifically the 
delineated presidential appointment and removal powers with respect to FTC 
commissioners, along with the broad discretion and flexibility accorded to 
the Commission in its mandate.  Also examined is a noteworthy case of these 
elements’ transnational adaptation,26 as seen in analogous provisions of the 
 
 25.  See generally ROBERT GILPIN, GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY: UNDERSTANDING THE 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER (2001) (illustrating that national policies critically shape a 
country’s economic affairs).  
 26.  Many of the emergent antitrust laws worldwide in recent decades have been modeled 
after their predecessors in the U.S. and the EU.  See, e.g., Kolasky: 
Let me turn finally to the new International Competition Network (or ICN). The 
last decade has seen market principles, deregulation and respect for competitive 
forces broadly embraced around the world. Over 90 countries—accounting for 
nearly 80 percent of world production (19)—have enacted antitrust laws, and at 
least 60 have antitrust merger notification regimes. Many of these laws are 
modeled after the U.S. or EU antitrust laws. Now the real work begins. Having 
convinced much of the world to structure their national economies around 
competition and free markets, we must ensure that antitrust works effectively and 
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South Korean MRFTA.  While far from carbon copies of the FTC Act, the 
MRFTA and numerous other U.S.-inspired foreign competition laws bear its 
substantive imprint without necessarily carrying over appurtenant time-
honored safeguards—internal and external to the statutory language—
against excessive presidential control over enforcement. 
Enacted in 1914 to bolster and clarify the government’s authority to 
hold accountable business enterprises that harm or endanger market 
competition, the FTC Act is one of three core federal antitrust laws together 
with the Sherman and Clayton Acts.  The “catch-all” legislation established 
the FTC and empowers commissioners to investigate a wide range of 
anticompetitive business practices and to penalize culpable companies.27  
Section 5 is central to the statute with its prohibition of “unfair methods of 
competition in or affecting commerce,” as well as “unfair or deceptive acts 
or practices in or affecting commerce.”28  Any violation of U.S. antitrust 
laws—including, but not limited to, monopolization under Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act and mergers and acquisitions that trigger Section 7 of the 
Clayton Act—constitutes a violation of the FTC Act. 
South Korea’s government enacted its MRFTA in late 1980 in response 
to a business climate wherein monopolists and dominant firms with 70 
percent or more market share had come to produce 89 percent of all industrial 
goods by 1979.29  In East Asia, the MRFTA was preceded by the Japanese 
Antimonopoly Law, which the American Occupation authorities themselves 
crafted largely in an attempt to stave off a future resurgence of the mega-
conglomerate zaibatsu that had sustained the Japanese Empire.30  Although 
 
efficiently to deliver what it promises. 
Supra note 6. 
 27.  See, e.g., Eleanor M. Fox, Chairman Miller, the Federal Trade Commission, 
Economics, and Rashomon, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 33 (1987).  
A commissioner of the Federal Trade Commission serves the combined functions of executive 
(prosecutor), legislator (rule maker and policymaker), and jurist. The FTC decides what 
complaints should be brought, what appeals should be taken, and when writs of certiorari 
should be sought. As a judicial body it sits in judgment on appeals from decisions of the FTC’s 
administrative law judges. As an administrative body it promulgates rules by which, as a 
judicial body, it has the power to compel compliance. 
 28.  Congress in 1938 amended the Act to also prohibit “unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices.” Wheeler-Lea Amendments of Act, ch. 49, § 3, 52 Stat. 111 (1938) (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006)). 
 29.  See MEONGCHO YANG, COMPETITION LAWS OF THE PACIFIC RIM: REPUBLIC OF KOREA 
(SOUTH KOREA), 1-1, 1-5 (1991) (demonstrating that the increased business concentration in 
the latter half of the 1970s reduced the competitiveness of South Korea’s domestic enterprises 
in the international markets and an imbalance in the country’s own national economy). 
 30.  See, e.g., Yi Sang-Seung and Jung Youngjin, A New Kid on the Block: Korean 
Competition Law, Policy, and Economics, 3 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 153, 158 (2007).   
Historically speaking, competition law began as an Anglo-American institution. In Japan, the 
U.S. occupation force, led by General MacArthur, introduced competition law after World 
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South Korea’s legal competition framework also received heavy influence 
from the U.S., it also diverged in some details, not the least because many 
South Korean politicians wanted to expedite the continued advances of their 
own country’s mega-conglomerates, the chaebol.31  Fairly unsubtle structural 
differences came to increase the clout of the Korean Fair Trade Commission 
(“KFTC”) relative to that of its U.S. counterpart while limiting the private 
consumer’s voice.  Unlike in the U.S. where the FTC shares antitrust 
enforcement responsibilities with the DOJ, in South Korea the Prosecutor’s 
Office involves itself only when the KFTC refers a matter to it; Korean law 
also does not permit antitrust class action lawsuits, nor are private parties 
allowed to file for injunctions against alleged MRFTA violations in court.32 
In sum, virtually all roads with respect to competition regulation in 
South Korea must run through the KFTC,33 whereas the FTC is only one 
domestic driver of U.S. antitrust matters.  Just as South Korea’s antitrust 
enforcement paradigm differs from that of the U.S. despite the latter’s 
imprint, so too do those of other countries; the structural impact of 
underlying constructivist disparities certainly must be considered when 
examining overseas instances of agenda-driven antitrust enforcement.  All 
the same, widely diffused were the conventions of the FTC Act, which had 
been drafted in an era in which the competition agency was neither intended 
to be nor expected to become truly independent. 
 
War II, but its main purpose was to dissolve and prevent the resurgence of the zaibatsu, the 
family-controlled large conglomerates that financed the Japanese war machine. 
 31.  See, e.g., Danny Abir, Monopoly and Merger Regulation in South Korea and Japan: 
A Comparative Analysis, 13 INT’L TAX & BUS. L. 143, 175 (1996). 
South Korea and Japan are concerned with the growth of their industries. Judging from the 
manner in which antitrust measures are enforced in those countries, lenient application of their 
antitrust laws are a means of achieving their objectives. Both countries initially modeled their 
antitrust laws after those of the United States. However, unlike in the United States, they have 
not placed a lot of weight on enforcing regulations which control monopolies and mergers. 
See also infra note 105 and accompanying text. 
 32.  Yi & Jung, supra note 30, at 159.  Incidentally, “[d]eveloping countries are 
increasingly looking at the KFTC as a potential role model, on the assumption that they lack 
institutions needed for the kind of sophisticated antitrust enforcement seen in the United States 
or Europe.” Id. at 155. 
 33.  See id. at 160.  
[I]t could be argued that the KFTC is currently the single, most important enforcer 
of Korean competition law. The KFTC’s quasi-monopoly of enforcement of 
Korean competition law is distinct from the U.S. antitrust law, in which various 
stakeholders such as individuals and state governments may also initiate actions 
to enforce U.S. antitrust law. 
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A. The President’s Commissioner Appointment Power 
1. Power of Appointment in the FTC Act 
The presidential power to appoint FTC commissioners is established in 
the opening section of the FTC Act and has remained unmodified since its 
inception in 1914.  Section 1 provides that: 
A commission is created and established, to be known as the 
Federal Trade Commission which shall be composed of five 
Commissioners, who shall be appointed by the President, by and 
with the advice and consent of the Senate.  Not more than three of 
the Commissioners shall be members of the same political party.  
The first Commissioners appointed shall continue in office for 
terms of three, four, five, six, and seven years, respectively, from 
September 26, 1914, the term of each to be designated by the 
President, but their successors shall be appointed for terms of 
seven years, except that any person chosen to fill a vacancy shall 
be appointed only for the unexpired term of the Commissioner 
whom he shall succeed. The President shall choose a chairman 
from the Commission’s membership.34 
Although this bipartisan, staggered fixed-term appointment clause can 
be found duplicated in other United States statutes that established 
independent agencies, the FTC Act is one of the earliest instances of the 
template’s use.35  The statutory language purposefully aims for an 
ideological balance in the FTC’s membership by ensuring that at least two 
of five commissioners cannot belong to the same political party as the 
President.  Requirements of Senate consent and staggered terms are also 
meant to prevent excessive partisan influence on the activities of 
commissioners.  In the case of the United States, the longer a party controls 
the presidency, the greater the prospects for sympathetic commissions 
aligned with presidential preferences in matters of policy.  A two-term 
President through the course of eight years can personally appoint the 
entirety of a five-member Commission, albeit only over time. 
The FTC Act also confers on the President the consequential power to 
select a Chairman of the FTC.36  Although the chairperson does not possess 
 
 34.  15 U.S.C. § 41 (1914).   
 35.  See, e.g., Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-84 (mandating staggered 
appointments). The Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 that created the first independent 
agency, the now-defunct Interstate Commerce Commission, preceded the FTC Act in its use 
of the commissioner appointment provision. Interstate Commerce Act of 1988 § 11, 2 U.S.C. 
285(b) (1989). 
 36.  This provision did not exist in the original version of the statute, but was introduced 
with Reorganization Plan No. 8 of 1950, formally designating the Chairman as the FTC’s 
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any special formal authority to dominate policymaking, he or she has a 
strong say in selecting the issues to be covered by the Commission.37  Thus, 
the power to appoint a chair in and of itself renders tenuous any notion of 
airtight FTC independence from presidential direction in competition policy 
matters.  At least one noted administrative law scholar has described the 
President’s primary avenue for control over independent agencies as the 
appointment of the chairperson.38  The United States judiciary too, has 
acknowledged the power as a “lever[] of influence.”39  The FTC Act’s 
entrustment of chair appointment to the executive branch eventually would 
become a norm among antitrust agencies worldwide. 
Recent decades have seen the rise of ample literature questioning the 
true autonomy of the United States’ independent agencies, as well as 
scholarship on pressure directed towards the FTC from different 
administrations and political parties.40  For this Article’s purposes, it is 
sufficient to acknowledge that the FTC Act, much of it philosophically 
Theodore Roosevelt’s brainchild and further developed under Woodrow 
Wilson’s purview,41 did not apportion elsewhere or contain effective dams 
against the presidential appointment power. 
2. Power of Appointment in the MRFTA (South Korea) 
The South Korean MRFTA’s commissioner appointment clause 
resembles that of the FTC Act in two fundamental respects—it assigns to the 
President the appointment power, as well as the power to select a 
 
executive and administrative head. Reorganization Plan No. 8 of 1950, 15 Fed. Reg. 50,4496 
(May 25, 1950) (to be codified at 3 C.F.R. 3175). 
 37.  See Fox, supra note 27, at 33-34. 
 38.  Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and 
the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 587–91 (1984). 
 39.  Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 680 (D.C. 
Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2378 (2009). 
 40.  See, e.g., Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies 
(and Executive Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 842, 812 (2013) (rejecting the “binary 
distinction between independent and executive agencies,” and positing that instead, all 
agencies should be regarded as executive and seen as falling on a “spectrum from more 
independent to less independent.”); Neal Devins & David E. Lewis, Not-So Independent 
Agencies: Party Polarization and the Limits of Institutional Design, 88 B.U. L. REV. 459, 461 
(2008) (examining the “profound impact of party polarization on presidential control of 
independent agencies. . .”); Paul R. Verkuil, Jawboning Administrative Agencies: Ex Parte 
Contacts by the White House, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 943 (1980) (noting the various informal 
ways that presidents can apply pressure upon independent agencies, e.g. seeking new 
legislation from Congress, or removing support from an agency in budget negotiations with 
Congress). 
 41.  See generally Winerman, supra note 16. 
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chairperson.42  Beyond this shared base, the predisposition to presidential 
direction is further consolidated in the MRFTA via a number of 
modifications and omissions.  First, the legislative consent requirement 
found in the FTC Act is omitted.  The chair and a vice chair are appointed 
by the President at the recommendation of the Prime Minister (a ceremonial 
figure selected by the President from within the same party), while the other 
commissioners are appointed by the President at the recommendation of the 
chairperson.43  Second, the statute caps commissioner terms at three years 
and expressly allows for the possibility of a one term renewal per 
commissioner.44  Given that South Korean presidents serve a single term of 
five years, the MRFTA permits each executive to appoint his or her preferred 
commissioners for at least the bulk of a presidential term, and to potentially 
switch out his or her own appointees by not renewing their terms.  Third, the 
MRFTA does not contain a clause mandating a balance of political parties 
represented on the Commission.45 
Furthermore, the statute’s provision for four non-standing 
commissioners — in addition to the chairman, vice-chairman, and three 
standing commissioners for a total of nine commissioners46 — enables a 
hierarchy as well as promotion prospects, when coupled with presidential 
discretion over term renewal.  At least one standing commissioner is required 
to be present for an official chamber meeting, and standing commissioners 
are considered next-in-line surrogates after the chairman and vice-chairman, 
in order of their seniority, in the event of contingencies.47  This setup 
generally encourages conformity over maverick behavior on the part of 
commissioners who would prefer to exert a larger impact than would be 
possible with a single three-year term as a lower-tier commissioner. 
In sum, the MRFTA’s drafters incorporated the basic framework of the 
FTC Act’s presidential appointment clause while further magnifying the 
KFTC’s susceptibility to political influence and oversight from the executive 
 
 42.  Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act, Act No. 3320, Dec. 31, 1980, art. 37 (S. 
Kor.), translated by Korea Legislation Research Institute (2015), [hereinafter “MRFTA”].  
 43.  Id.  
 44.  Id. at art. 39. Commissioner reappointments to the United States FTC also have 
occurred, although they are not commonplace. One notable instance involved Republican 
President Calvin Coolidge’s reappointment of Commissioner William Humphrey, a fellow 
Republican, to a second term that would extend to President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 
presidency. Roosevelt would later attempt to remove Humphrey from his post for political 
reasons. See infra note 56 and accompanying text.  
 45.  Id. at art. 41. In this apparent effort to negate the prospect of partisan conflict within 
the KFTC, the MRFTA also effectively removes a potential source of pushback against 
presidential dictates. 
 46.  Id. at art. 37. 
 47.  Id. at art. 38. 
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branch.48  The makeup of the appointment power is such that commissioner 
removal by the letter of the MRFTA becomes virtually unnecessary in 
practice.  The brief three-year terms of commissioners, all of whom may hail 
from the same party as the President and eye new bureaucratic or political 
postings during a five-year presidential administration, render unlikely any 
protracted battles.  Hence “voluntary” resignations are more practical for the 
parties involved. 
B. The President’s Commissioner Removal Power 
1. Power of Removal in the FTC Act and Relevant Case Law 
Section 1 of the FTC Act provides that “[a]ny Commissioner may be 
removed by the President for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in 
office.”49  The removal power originates from the U.S. Constitution, which 
tasks the President with the duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed.”50  The first United States Congress consequently endorsed 
plenary presidential power over officers appointed by the President, rejecting 
a legislative removal power in favor of the Senate’s advice and consent.51  
Independent agencies including the FTC were later crafted in accordance 
with this position.52  The original language of the FTC Act did not clearly 
distinguish between at-will and for-cause commissioner removal by the 
President, nor did it expressly permit or prohibit the former. 
Two decades after the FTC Act’s passage and in a blow to unfettered 
executive branch control over FTC commissioners, the Supreme Court 
issued the landmark decision of Humphrey’s Executor v. United States.53  
 
 48.  In stark contrast to 20th century domestic U.S. politics, the South Korean center-
right boasted a continuous grip on the presidency and legislature from the country’s post-
WWII inception until 1998 and 2004, respectively. The drafting of the MRFTA in 1980 
occurred within this imbalanced political environment. 
 49.  15 U.S.C. § 41 (1914).   
 50.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
 51.  See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 722 (1986) (holding that Congress 
unconstitutionally aggrandized its own power by enacting a statute with for cause legislative 
removal power of an executive officer, which was a usurpation of executive power).  
 52.  See Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE: 
PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH 258 (2012) (“The scant legislative history 
that does exist suggests that Congress probably did not have a clear idea of the relationship 
between the independent agencies and the president. If anything, the legislative history 
suggests that Congress regarded the removal provisions in the FTC Act as a check on the 
commission’s power, not the president’s, and that Congress thought about the FTC’s 
independence in terms of freedom from partisanship rather than freedom from presidential 
control.”). 
 53.  295 U.S. 602 (1935). 
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Humphrey’s Executor clipped the presidential removal power by 
distinguishing between executive officers that could be removed at will by 
the President, and quasi-legislative and/or quasi-judicial officers in whose 
case Congress possesses the authority “to fix the period during which they 
shall continue in office, and to forbid their removal except for cause in the 
meantime.”54  The Court asserted that FTC commissioners belong to the 
latter category.55  After President Franklin D. Roosevelt had moved to fire 
Commissioner William Humphrey due to Humphrey’s allegedly lukewarm 
support for his New Deal policies,56 the Court ruled that FTC commissioners 
could not be removed from their posts solely for political reasons, by virtue 
of their quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial status. 
Humphrey’s Executor remains in force today, although successive 
Supreme Court decisions have stressed the fine line between the independent 
agency’s autonomy and potential extra-constitutional infringement of the 
President’s powers under Article II of the Constitution.  In Morrison v. 
Olson, the Supreme Court upheld a for-cause removal provision for an 
independent counsel performing special investigatory and prosecutorial 
functions.57  However, the Morrison court emphasized that this removal 
limitation was allowable only because the independent counsel acted in the 
narrow, unusual, and limited capacity of investigating the conduct of high-
ranking executive branch officials.58  Moreover, according to the Court, the 
limitation on the removal power did not unconstitutionally infringe on the 
President’s Article II powers due to the independent counsel’s direct line of 
accountability to the President through the Attorney General.59  This carved-
out exception came to coexist with the Court’s Bowsher v. Synar decision60 
two years prior in 1986, where it had held that the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings 
Act was unconstitutional for empowering Congress rather than the President 
with the power to terminate the U.S. Comptroller General for inefficiency, 
neglect of duty, or malfeasance.  Bowsher nonetheless noted that these terms, 
identical to those found in the FTC Act, “are very broad and . . . could sustain 
removal of a Comptroller General for any number of actual or perceived 
transgressions.”61  Per the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of Humphrey’s 
 
 54.  Id. at 629. 
 55.  Id. at 628. 
 56.  MARIAN C. MCKENNA, FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT AND THE GREAT CONSTITUTIONAL 
WAR: THE COURT-PACKING CRISIS OF 1937 96–99 (2002). 
 57.  487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
 58.  Id. at 655. 
 59.  See Id. at 692 (“We do not think that this limitation as it presently stands sufficiently 
deprives the President of control over the independent counsel to interfere impermissibly with 
his constitutional obligation to ensure the faithful execution of the laws.”). 
 60.  478 U.S. 714 (1986). 
 61.  Id. at 714. 
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Executor, “[t]he power to remove is the power to control,”62 and it further 
extrapolated from Bowsher that “the removal power need not be exercised 
to exert effective control, [as] the mere existence of removal authority is 
likely to influence behavior”63—a reality as applicable to the FTC as it has 
been to any independent agency.  In the wake of the FDR administration, the 
U.S. for its part benefited from a gradual development of regulatory norms 
discouraging excessive presidential interference with the FTC, which has 
contributed to a lack of removal flashpoints since.  Without the luxury of 
time to organically foster such conventions, foreign governments inspired by 
the FTC Act were left to transplant the legal ambiguity of its removal power, 
the likes of which had so bedeviled the American judiciary. 
2. Power of Removal in the MRFTA (South Korea) 
The KFTC refers to itself as a “quasi-judiciary body,”64 seemingly in 
the vein of the U.S. Supreme Court’s recasting of the FTC.  Apropos, the 
removal clause in the MRFTA appears to forbid at-will presidential removals 
of commissioners: 
No commissioner shall be removed from office or 
decommissioned contrary to his/her intention except in any of the 
following cases: 
 
1. Where he/she has been sentenced to imprisonment 
without prison labor or severer; 
2. Where he/she becomes incapable of performing his/her 
duties due to prolonged physical or mental weakness.65 
 
Yet the MRFTA’s removal clause manages to retain the lack of clarity 
found in its FTC Act forerunner that had necessitated judicial intervention 
against Franklin D. Roosevelt.  The statute does not adopt the FTC Act’s 
“inefficiency” or “neglect of duty” as causes for removal, substituting 
instead “prolonged physical or mental weakness,” yet in so doing, likewise 
opens the door to potentially subjective determinations.  Additionally, the 
removal clause’s reference to “intention” can and has become problematic.  
A commissioner may encounter strong presidential pressure to relinquish the 
post for any number of reasons, legitimate or superficial—if the 
commissioner thereafter seeks a further role in the incumbent administration, 
 
 62.  Silver v. US Postal Service, 951 F.2d 1033, 1039 (1991). 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  KOREA FAIR TRADE COMMISSION, http://www.ftc.go.kr/eng/index.jsp [https://per
ma.cc/L6UJ-VTVB] (last visited July 29, 2017). 
 65.  MRFTA, Act No. 3320, Dec. 31, 1980, art. 40 (S. Kor.). 
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a voluntary resignation becomes the only realistic option. 
When coupled with KFTC commissioners’ brief terms limited to three 
years and the motivation of promotion and/or term renewal, statute-based 
removal proves nearly superfluous to inevitable presidential influence over 
the agency.  The MRFTA’s drafters ensured that even in the worst case 
scenario, the odd commissioner with maverick tendencies could be cycled 
out in relatively short order by the President.  They hence chose to mirror the 
general ambiguity of the FTC Act’s removal clause for the MRFTA, rather 
than balking from or further elaborating upon it. 
C. Elastic Statutory Language and Purpose 
1. Interpretive Latitude in the FTC Act 
A dearth of clarity on standards and criteria has been part and parcel of 
the FTC Act’s considerable normative influence abroad,66 especially with 
respect to areas of regulator discretion in enforcement.  Within two years of 
the statute’s enactment, President Wilson would confess candidly of the new 
FTC: “It is hard to describe the functions of [the] [C]ommission.  All I can 
say is that it has transformed the Government of the United States from being 
an antagonist of business into being a friend of business.”67  While Wilson 
may have been referring to the FTC as a shield for business owners against 
monopolies and dominant competitors, his inability to easily condense the 
mandate of the Commission spoke to its versatility and breadth.  The FTC 
Act’s purview over any “unfair methods of competition”68 per its Section 5 
granted the agency wide berth in pursuing both ongoing and incipient 
antitrust violations beyond the Sherman Act’s reach, instead of limiting the 
FTC to codified standards and prescriptions for a generally defined set of 
antitrust violations.  According to Winerman, “then, as now, the agency 
combined formal powers to investigate [and] formal powers to prosecute,” 
while permitting dialogues “with business to facilitate compliance with the 
 
 66.  See, e.g., Abir, supra note 31, at 143 (“The success of antitrust regulation in the 
United States is a compelling reason why industrial countries adopted legislation dealing with 
monopolies and restrictive business agreements.”). 
 67.  Wilson, supra note 17, at 265.  Wilson envisioned the FTC as fulfilling a finesse role 
that the DOJ could not. See id. at 340-341 (“[A]n attempt was very properly made. . . to 
provide tribunals which would distinctly determine what was fair and what was unfair 
competition; and to supply the business community, not merely with lawyers in the 
Department of Justice who could cry, ‘Stop!’, but with men in such tribunals as the Federal 
Trade Commission, who could say, ‘Go on,’ who could warn where things were going wrong 
and assist instead of check.”).  
 68.  Winerman, supra note 16, at 68.  Before the FTC Act’s passage, Section 5 was 
opposed by congressional critics for “the broad discretion they understood the statute to 
convey.”  
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law (those emphasized by Wilson).”69  As discussed, there existed a strong 
predilection in the FTC Act’s originators towards favoring cooperation with 
big business over heavy-handed policing and resultant debilitation of the 
national economy.  The inferred use of discretion prevalent throughout the 
statute proved conducive to this aim. 
Section 5 proceeds to state that a person, partnership, or corporation 
believed culpable of antitrust violations by the FTC will be issued a 
complaint and a notice of a hearing if “it shall appear to the Commission that 
a proceeding by it in respect thereof would be to the interest of the public.”70  
This invocation of the public interest without further elaboration has left 
open a sizable margin for interpretive license,71 not the least a presumption 
that the public referenced is the domestic public.  Certainly the public interest 
varies from country to country and is not a fixed concept.  Even within a 
single domestic polity, different interest groups may be at odds regarding its 
intuitive definition.  Former FTC Chairman William Kovacic noted that “in 
the 1950s and the 1970s, Commission efforts to use Section 5 litigation 
elicited strong political backlash from the Congress. The very breadth of 
Section 5 creates political risks in its application.”72  Whether manifestations 
of checks and balances or politicized affairs, such historical developments 
contributed to extralegal U.S. regulatory norms in antitrust enforcement that 
foreign competition regimes could not transplant and adapt in the same 
manner that they did American competition laws. 
Section 5 also states “in determining whether an act or practice is unfair, 
the Commission may consider established public policies as evidence,” with 
the qualifier that “[s]uch public policy considerations may not serve as a 
primary basis for such determination.”73  Befitting the FTC Act’s elastic 
mandate, no specific examples of any such public policies are offered.  
Furthermore, the FTC may find unlawful only the unfair method of 
competition that “causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers 
not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition.”74  
Without further elaboration on countervailing benefits, the statute cedes to 
the Commission the leeway to finesse its responses to complex antitrust 
 
 69.  Id. at 97. 
 70.  15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1914).   
 71.  Especially during periods of economic upheaval, interpretations of the “interest of 
the public” can evolve.  See, e.g., Winerman, supra note 16, at 5 (“The Commission’s early 
history would soon play out against a new backdrop, as wartime mobilization would 
encourage, and to some extent legitimate, unprecedented coordination under government 
auspices.”). 
 72.  William E. Kovacic & Marc Winerman, Competition Policy and the Application of 
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 929, 943 (2010). 
 73.  15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2006).   
 74.  Id. 
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violations.  While guidance to fill these descriptive gaps has been supplied 
domestically by over a century of successive judicial decisions, alongside 
evolving conventions accounting for legislative as well as private sector 
interests, most foreign competition regimes lack a comparable array of 
participant actors beyond the executive branch.75  When acting in a relative 
vacuum of precedent and checks, protectionist administrations abroad 
encounter less resistance to their justifications for selective antitrust 
enforcement in the name of public policy and/or countervailing national 
economic benefits. 
Section 5 is not explicit regarding openness to presidential control, but 
Section 6 includes direct mention of presidential prerogative: “The 
Commission shall also have power. . . [u]pon the direction of the President 
or either House of Congress to investigate and report the facts relating to any 
alleged violations of the antitrust Acts by any corporation.”76  Wilson was 
quick to rely on Section 6,77 and even as the notion of FTC autonomy later 
became entrenched in the U.S., this portion of the FTC Act was left un-
amended.  Today, the language easily could be construed overseas as an 
affirmation of the FTC’s subservience to the executive branch.  In the event 
that foreign readers of the Act fail or do not choose to connect the historical 
dots, they would be unable to find any undergirding support for agency 
independence in Section 5 or 6.  Indeed, novel expansions of FTC autonomy 
in Section 5 cases still risk political crossfire for “going beyond established 
principles of antitrust doctrine—principles set in the resolution of Clayton or 
Sherman Act disputes creat[ing] immediate opportunities to scold the 
Commission for taking ‘unprecedented’ measures or entering ‘uncharted’ 
territory,” per Kovacic.78  The originators of the legislation would not have 
had it any other way. 
 
 75.  Divergence in culture also cannot be discounted.  In 2015, President Barack Obama 
was purported to be the first sitting U.S. president to visit the FTC’s offices since Franklin D. 
Roosevelt in 1937.  President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at the Federal Trade 
Commission (Jan. 12, 2015) (transcript available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2015/01/12/remarks-president-federal-trade-commission [https://perma.cc/2CLG-7M
4Q]).  
 76.  15 U.S.C. § 46(d) (2006).   
 77.  See Calabresi & Yoo, supra note 52, at 259 (“Wilson did not hesitate to use his power 
to direct FTC investigations, launching many of the FTC’s major initiatives.”). 
 78.  Kovacic & Winerman, supra note 72, at 943.  Kovacic is blunt in his assessment that 
“Section 5 is important to the FTC in theory, but efforts to implement it have seen only limited 
success in practice.  Future efforts to develop Section 5 jurisprudence must account for these 
past problems, if the Commission is to attain better results the next time.  The Commission 
needs to articulate, perhaps through a policy statement prior to litigation, the basis on which 
it intends to proceed.” Id. at 950. 
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2. Interpretive Latitude in the MRFTA (South Korea) 
The South Korean MRFTA also contains provisions regarding 
consideration of the public interest and public policies in determining an 
antitrust response.  Although they appear to go into more granular detail than 
their U.S. precursors, the analogous MRFTA provisions similarly are left 
open to broad interpretation and enable extensive discretion in accordance 
with the executive branch’s economic goals.  Significantly, the MRFTA 
exempts certain “unfair collaborative acts” from punishment: 
The provisions of paragraph (1) shall not apply, where unfair 
collaborative practices are authorized by the Fair Trade 
Commission as satisfying the requirements prescribed by 
Presidential Decree, and they are conducted for any of the 
following purposes: 
 
1. Industry rationalization; 
2. Research and technology development; 
3. Overcoming of economic depression; 
4. Industrial restructuring; 
5. Rationalization of trade terms and conditions; 
6. Improvement of competitiveness of small and medium 
enterprises.79 
 
The referenced Presidential Decree (one of many integrated into the 
MRFTA’s supplementary Enforcement Decree) outlines the criteria to 
qualify for exemption and exhibits a heavy dependence on KFTC construal.  
For instance, with respect to “industry rationalization,” the agency must first 
find that “the effect of technical advancement, quality improvement, cost 
curtailment, efficiency promotion, etc. by the collaborative act is obvious,”80 
in which case it will tolerate the anti-competitive conduct deemed beneficial 
to industry, presumably with the public (national) interest in mind.  The 
KFTC also must deem that “it is difficult to attain the industrial 
rationalization through any way, other than the collaborative act,” and that 
“the effect of industrial rationalization is greater than that of the restriction 
on competition”81—both markedly subjective determinations.  The final 
criterion echoed the FTC Act’s exemption for unfair methods of competition 
where the harms are outweighed by “countervailing benefits to consumers 
 
 79.  MRFTA, Act No. 3320, Dec. 31, 1980, art. 19 (S. Kor.). 
 80.  Enforcement Decree of the MRFTA, Presidential Decree No. 12979, Apr. 14, 1990, 
art. 24-2 (S. Kor.), translated by Korea Legislation Research Institute (2015). 
 81.  Id. 
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or to competition,”82 the assessment of which is left to the FTC. 
The MRFTA’s requirements for the “overcom[ing of] economic 
depression” exemption are even more nebulous.  Unfair collaborative acts 
can be permitted upon satisfaction of the following conditions: 
1. Where the demand for specified goods or services continues 
to be reduced for a considerable period, and the supply exceeds 
considerably the demand, and where such state is obviously 
going to continue in the future; 
2. Where the market price of the goods or services remains below 
the average production costs for a considerable period; 
3. Where a considerable number of enterprises in the business 
field might find it difficult to continue business activities due 
to economic depression; 
4. Where matters as referred to in subparagraphs 1 through 3 are 
unable to be overcome through the rationalization of 
enterprises.83 
The criteria’s qualitative thresholds—over “a considerable period,” 
wherein “supply exceeds considerably the demand, and where such state is 
obviously going to continue,” and endangerment of a “considerable number 
of enterprises”—welcomes discretionary judgment calls on the part of the 
KFTC.84  When anticompetitive collaboration is carried out by a group of 
domestic companies, not only are foreign competitors harmed in both 
domestic and foreign markets, but also gains can come at the expense of all 
consumers paying higher prices wherever the advantaged products reach.85  
Allowing such behavior for the “overcoming of economic depression” 
shelters cartels and advances a selective interpretation of the public interest, 
one subsumed under protectionist and potentially mercantilist policy. 
The MRFTA also carries over the direct presidential prerogative 
preserved by the FTC Act’s Section 686 and replicates it across numerous 
sections.  The statute is replete with amendments referencing Presidential 
Decrees for the terms of general rules, and such is the extent of this 
delegating act that Article 3-2 (Prohibition of Abuse of Market-Dominating 
Position) expressly states, “[c]ategories or standards for abusive acts shall be 
determined by Presidential Decree.”87  Thus, timely executive preferences 
may outright dictate novel substantive definitions for illegal anticompetitive 
 
 82.  15 U.S.C. § 45(n); see supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
 83.  Enforcement Decree of the MRFTA, art. 25. (S. Kor.). 
 84.  Id.  
 85.  Eleanor M. Fox & Janusz A. Ordover, The Harmonization of Competition and Trade 
Law: the Case for Modest Linkages of Law and Limits to Parochial State Action, 19 WORLD 
COMPETITION 5, 14-15 (1995).  
 86. 15 U.S.C. § 46(d); see supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
 87.  MRFTA, Act No. 3320, Dec. 31, 1980, art. 3-2(2) (S. Kor.). 
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conduct or modify pre-existing categories and benchmarks.  The other 
subsections of Article 3-2 hinge on “unreasonably” and “unfairly” abusing a 
position of market dominance,88 undefined standards echoing the FTC Act’s 
relative flexibility shown towards dominant firms—comprising an approach 
that contrasts with those of other major jurisdictions such as the EU to this 
day.89  We will next analyze how, under South Korea’s recent Lee Myung-
Bak administration, already amenable competition laws influenced by their 
U.S. antecedents90 were distended further to accommodate a strong 
executive’s overarching mercantilist policy and a national antitrust silo. 
II.      AN ANTITRUST SILO BY EXECUTIVE DESIGN IN SOUTH KOREA 
Three developments foreshadowed the direction of Seoul’s competition 
regime during Lee Myung-Bak’s presidency from 2008 to 2013.  First, a 
global financial contagion precipitated by U.S. subprime mortgages spread 
to Asian markets beginning in late 2007.91  According to Lee, “[w]hen the 
2008 global economic crisis struck, many said that it was the worst crisis to 
hit the global economy since the Great Depression of the 1930s . . . It was a 
chilling reminder of how fragile our world is . . . .”92  Second, in March 2008 
within a month of his February inauguration, Lee (a former chief executive 
 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  See, e.g., Claire Cain Miller & Mark Scott, Google Settles Its European Antitrust 
Case; Critics Remain, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2014, at B1 (“The European Commission has gone 
further than the F.T.C. in extracting concessions from Google in large part because European 
antitrust law gives more priority to protecting competing companies. United States antitrust 
doctrine gives dominant companies more freedom if they can prove they are creating a better 
product for consumers, which was a central factor in the F.T.C.’s decision to close its case 
without charges.”). 
 90.  Washington for its part has argued that single-country export cartels could 
potentially bring innovation and lower prices, arguing against their outright prohibition or 
treatment as a per se violation. See Marek Martyniszyn, Export Cartels: Is it Legal to Target 
Your Neighbour? Analysis in Light of Recent Case Law, 15 J. INT. ECON. L. 181, 189-190 
(2012) (“The USA, who expressly allows export cartels, defended them recognizing an 
enabling and efficiency arguments. It pointed to the OECD Recommendation permitting 
members to exclude export cartels from cartel enforcement in a transparent manner and 
suggested exclusion from a definition of hardcore cartels for agreements having ‘a significant 
potential to enhance efficiency.’ They underlined that export cartels may have procompetitive 
effects, allowing firms that hitherto did not engage in export activities to do so. Moreover, the 
USA claimed that export cartels may bring innovation and lower prices, underlining that their 
prohibition or per se treatment would be inappropriate.”). 
 91.  See ANDREW GORDON, A MODERN HISTORY OF JAPAN 336 (2014) (“[T]he American 
economy began to crumble under the massive weight of an unsustainable binge of home loans 
aggressively and deceptively marketed to millions . . . “); C. H. Park, A Whirlpool of 
Historical Controversies in Widening Waters of Cooperation, in CHANGING POWER 
RELATIONS IN NORTHEAST ASIA 39, 45 (Marie Soderberg ed., 2011). 
 92.  LEE MYUNG-BAK, THE UNCHARTED PATH 271 (2011). 
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of Hyundai Engineering and Construction) explained his vision for 
competition regulation under his administration whereby “the [KFTC] 
commission should introduce a totally new system. It should support 
businesses by easing regulations as much as possible so that all enterprises 
can conduct their business well.”93  The KFTC, following lockstep as had the 
FTC during the Wilson years, announced that the equity investment limit on 
large companies would be eased along with other investment restrictions 
through MRFTA and Enforcement Decree revisions at the National 
Assembly,94 effectively backtracking from reform of corporate governance; 
Lee’s governing Grand National Party held a majority of seats and could 
ensure their passage.95  Third, also in March 2008, the KFTC established the 
International Cartel Division within its Cartel Bureau to exclusively 
investigate international cartels.96 
In a paradox of sorts, after Lee took office, he criticized the KFTC for 
having adhered to “backward rules” he perceived as unsuitable for the ever-
advancing global economy.97  Yet his own brand of agency 
micromanagement was more suggestive of planned government oversight 
over developing economies than liberal economic policy for established 
powerhouses such as South Korea.98  Lee’s commissioner appointment and 
 
 93.  Kim Yon-se, New Legislature to Act on Pro-Chaebol Bills, KOREA TIMES (May 19, 
2008, 9:10 PM), http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/special/2009/10/180_24412.html 
[https://perma.cc/T4Q3-7F55]. See also Witt, supra note 24, at 221 (describing “the generally 
pro-chaebol stance of the current president, Lee Myung-Bak, himself a former chaebol 
executive”); Dani Rodrik, The New Mercantilist Challenge, PROJECT SYNDICATE (Jan. 9, 
2013), https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-return-of-mercantilism-by-dani-
rodrik [https://perma.cc/68HJ-PJA5] (“The mercantilist model can be derided as state 
capitalism or cronyism. But when it works, as it has so often in Asia, the model’s 
‘government-business collaboration’ or ‘pro-business state’ quickly garners heavy praise. 
Lagging economies have not failed to notice that mercantilism can be their friend.”). 
 94.  Kim, supra note 93 (“Designed to make corporate governance structures more 
transparent and prevent the concentration of economic power, the investment limit guideline 
has been a symbol of regulations on chaebol for the past two decades. But the commission, 
which backed the rules during the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun administrations, made 
a policy shift after the election. Lee has promised a ‘business-friendly’ administration. . . 
Currently, subsidiaries of companies with assets of 2 trillion won or more are prohibited from 
making equity investments or offering loan guarantees to each other . . . . The regulator also 
said it plans to ease the process for firms to switch into holding companies if they meet the 
current requirement of a debt ratio below 200 percent. The agency plans to lift the corporate 
debt-ratio requirement, as well as the rule that limits an investor to hold a maximum stake of 
5 percent in a non-affiliate firm.”). 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  FTC to take on global cartels, KOREA JOONGANG DAILY (Mar. 4, 2008), 
http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=2886934 
[https://perma.cc/C9W9-XLE5]. 
 97.  Kim, supra note 93. 
 98.  South Korea under Lee Myung-Bak certainly was not the first, nor will it be the last, 
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removal powers, coupled with a mostly complaisant KFTC’s broad and 
flexible discretion in interpreting the MRFTA clauses relating to public 
interest and public policy, lent Lee the kind of regulatory authority wielded 
by U.S. presidents a century prior.  What followed during his administration 
were appointments of acquiescent KFTC chairs, greater tolerance for 
anticompetitive conduct by the chaebol, and arbitrary targeting of 
competitive foreign companies by the KFTC. 
A. De Facto Shuffling of KFTC Chairs at Will 
A tumult in global markets with the onset of World War I drove 
Woodrow Wilson to largely abandon antitrust regulation for a government-
led marshaling of business, depriving the FTC of any meaningful 
independence.99  In turn, it was a worldwide financial meltdown that 
emboldened Lee Myung-Bak to issue direct orders on KFTC policy.  
According to Lee, “[f]or many Koreans who had vivid memories of the 
1997-98 Asian financial crisis, the 2008 global crisis seemed ominous.”100  
He aimed to galvanize South Korea’s largest companies in response, 
hearkening back to previous presidents who had pushed for a rising tide of 
chaebol “national champions” that could supposedly lift all boats of the 
domestic economy through their success.101  Seeking to preside over a second 
act, Lee stated during a KFTC policy briefing in March 2008: 
The FTC has so far made a dent in the market economy and 
corporate activities, but I want it to have a new role in this new era. 
With all regulations lifted, supervision should be conducted. If 
companies are tied one by one, they won’t be able to compete with 
[their rivals overseas]. . . . They are fighting with unfavorable 
conditions amid competition in the global economy. To do so, they 
must be allowed to escape various regulations. Let’s take just a 
 
East Asian state that pursued mercantilist policies.  See, e.g., Dani Rodrik, supra note 93 (“[A] 
succession of Asian countries managed to grow by leaps and bounds by applying different 
variants of mercantilism. Governments in rich countries for the most part looked the other 
way while Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and China protected their home markets, appropriated 
‘intellectual property,’ subsidized their producers, and managed their currencies.”).  
 99.  See W.H.S. Stevens, What Has the Federal Trade Commission Accomplished?, 15 
THE AM. ECON. REV. 625, 636-37 (1925) (discussing the President’s control over the FTC, 
which he required to provide numerous government agencies with cost reports on scores of 
commodities). 
 100.  LEE, supra note 92, at 271. 
 101.  See Witt, supra note 24, at 217-219 (“While the Korean [developmental] model was 
Japanese inspired, . . . [t]he Korean developmental state was much more top-down, especially 
in its early days. Business was not a partner, as in Japan, but a subservient tool . . . . Despite 
democratization from the 1980s onward, decision-making has remained top down and centred 
[sic] on the president.”).   
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Reminiscent of the FTC Act’s amenability to direct top-down 
Wilsonian regulatory policy, the MRFTA accommodated Lee’s steering of 
the KFTC, starting with his power to appoint new commissioners when 
three-year term expirations gave way to openings at the commencement of 
his presidency.  He would duly bestow upon his two picks the top posts of 
Chairman and Vice-Chairman.103 
Lee tapped Baek Yong-Ho, a former university professor and head of a 
public policy think tank, as his first Chairman of the KFTC.104  Chairman 
Baek initially followed the President’s vision for defanging previously 
existing MRFTA provisions105 and in so doing drew an extraordinary rebuke 
from former Chairman Kang Cheol-Gyu, who asserted, “The [K]FTC should 
focus on market-friendly policies that can curb dominance and monopolies, 
but ironically, it unveiled plans for a chaebol-friendly policy.”106  Baek’s 
approach typified Seoul’s acutely nationalist economic strategy of the 
period.  He believed that the global financial crisis had “exposed the 
limitations of neoliberalism. . . Korea strictly follows its market economy 
principles, although its regulations tend to be more excessive than those of 
other advanced nations.”107  Baek in effect argued that residual regulation 
unreached by neoliberalist policies—rather than runaway deregulation—had 
 
 102.  Anti-trust Trade Commission Unveils Plan to Ease Regulations for Conglomerates, 
supra note 2. 
 103.  See Kim, supra note 93. (“The [Korean] Fair Trade Commission . . . is likely to see 
its status shaken as the nation’s top corporate regulator, as its top posts are filled with figures 
who oppose various regulations against enterprises . . . . Baek Yong-ho and Seo Dong-won, 
chairman and vice chairman of the commission, respectively, took part in the presidential 
transition committee to lay the groundwork for the Lee administration’s fair trade policies. 
Under Lee’s guidelines . . . Baek and Seo played a leading role in setting the keynote of fair 
trade policies, typified by the abolition of various regulations on chaebol, or family-controlled 
conglomerates. Baek, an ardent advocate for abolition of the equity investment ceiling system, 
expressed negative views about introducing alternative measures to the regulation. 
‘Regulations only create more regulations,’ he said.”).  
 104.  University at Albany Alumni to be Honored May 3 for Contributions, UNIVERSITY 
AT ALBANY: NEWS CENTER, http://www.albany.edu/news/50061.php?WT.svl=headline 
[https://perma.cc/L66J-DNBW] (last visited Oct. 15, 2017). 
 105.  See Kim, supra note 93. The MRFTA’s substantial Article 10 (Ceiling on Total 
Amount of Shareholding in Other Domestic Companies) was deleted altogether in the March 
2009 amended version during the Lee Myung-Bak administration. MRFTA, Act No. 9554, 
Mar. 25, 2009 (S. Kor.).  For Article 10’s text, see MRFTA, Act No. 8666, Oct. 17, 2007 (S. 
Kor.).  
 106.  Anti-trust Trade Commission Unveils Plan to Ease Regulations for Conglomerates, 
supra note 2. 
 107.  FTC Head: Excessive Market Regulation in Korea, KBS WORLD RADIO (Oct. 31, 
2008), http://rki.kbs.co.kr/english/news/news_Ec_detail.htm?No=58732&id=Ec [https://per
ma. cc/6HWH-CP2U]. 
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led to worldwide crisis, and advocated a return to unconstrained growth.  Per 
the economist James Riedel, a main contribution of South Korea’s leaders to 
the country’s postwar economic ascendance had been “principally in 
removing the obstacles to growth which they themselves put there in the first 
place.”108  While doing so, they could “anticipate and offset the market 
distortions that result[ed] from dirigiste strategies of industrialization”109 that 
protected Korean industries during their early development.  Lee Myung-
Bak did not possess the absolute sway over economic policy enjoyed by 
certain of his more authoritarian predecessors, but the MRFTA was not 
averse to his virtual control over competition policy. 
An opportunity to test the extent to which the MRFTA’s appointment 
and removal powers would bend for Lee emerged ahead of schedule, in ad 
hoc fashion.  Chairman Baek criticized the chaebols’ desire for a “poison 
pill” takeover defense and a dual-class stock system in an October 2008 
interview with a major left-leaning Korean newspaper, stating that it was 
contradictory for them to “want deregulation on the one hand, while 
demanding protection of management rights on the other.”110  Baek’s 
outspoken stance appeared at odds with that of the pro-chaebol Lee—given 
“the wave of business-friendly and deregulatory measures sweeping the 
government since the inauguration of the Lee Myung-Bak administration, it 
seem[ed] unusual for a government agency to put the brakes on a demand 
from conglomerates.”111  Baek proceeded to publicly warn against 
government policy that would coddle chaebol to the detriment of an efficient 
free market: 
A company’s access to the market, [self-liquidation], spin-off or 
acquisition of other companies should be permitted along with the 
organic evolution of the market . . . Corporate takeovers are no 
doubt necessary for the development of the market economy . . . 
The market can develop only if companies that experience 
management failures feel the threat of losing their management 
rights. Having the government intervene to protect their 
management rights would undermine market efficiency.112 
Within eight months of Baek’s stand and after hardly a year of his three-
year KFTC commissioner term had passed, he “unexpectedly” resigned from 
 
 108.  James Riedel, Economic Development in East Asia: Doing What Comes Naturally?, 
in ACHIEVING INDUSTRIALIZATION IN EAST ASIA 1, 36 (Helen Hughes ed., 1988). 
 109.  Id. at 37. 
 110.  Fair Trade Commission voices opposition to takeover defense mechanisms, THE 
HANKYOREH, (Oct. 8, 2008), http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_business/314
710.html [https://perma.cc/MAE4-88JV]. 
 111.  Id. 
 112.  Id. 
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his post in June 2009 to head the National Tax Service.113 
None of the MRFTA’s requirements to remove a commissioner for 
cause had been met.  Lee instead managed to circumvent the removal clause 
thanks to the same implicit power dynamic enabled by the FTC Act that the 
U.S. Ninth Circuit had succinctly summarized—the power to remove is the 
power to control, and the removal power need not be exercised to exert 
effective control as its mere existence likely influences behavior.114  Baek’s 
sudden resignation only to move on to the National Tax Service implied that 
Lee had a hand in the matter, and had Baek resisted, he risked non-renewal 
of his commissioner term followed by ejection from government service.  
The “voluntary” departure was indicative of Lee’s ability to shuffle KFTC 
leadership at will, a path made simpler in the absence of a Humphrey’s 
Executor type of check.  Regarding Baek’s replacement, Dr. Chung Ho-Yul, 
South Korea’s largest law firm discerned that he had not been tapped from 
the KFTC’s internal pool of candidates; it also opined that Chung’s prior 
service “as an adviser for the current administration’s fair trade policies 
makes it likely that the administration will be able to continue its efforts to 
revitalize the economy by loosening corporate regulations.”115  Yet the 
elasticity of the MRFTA’s stated appointment and removal powers was 
underscored when Lee again made a mid-stream chairman switch in January 
2011 after a brief 18-month tenure for Chung, bringing in economic policy 
specialist Kim Dong-Soo to take over for the remainder of his presidency.116  
The FTC Act’s textual ambivalence towards agency independence yielded 
few guideposts for its foreign derivatives in these circumstances.  The de 
facto at-will, activist calibrations of KFTC leadership by Lee facilitated a 
South Korean national silo in antitrust enforcement. 
B. Lenient Domestic Enforcement for the Mega-Conglomerate 
 
 113.  KFTC Leader Resigns, GLOBAL COMPETITION REV.: GCR ALERTS, (June 23, 2009) 
http://globalcompetitionreview.com/news/article/16214/kftc-leader-resigns 
[https://perma.cc/FC9L-N4NW] (“Yong-Ho Baek, head of Korea’s Fair Trade Commission, 
has unexpectedly resigned to take up an appointment at the National Tax Service”). 
 114.  See Silver v. US Postal Service, supra note 62 at 1039, and accompanying text 
(discussing how the removal power influences behavior through subservience, indicated by 
the lack of independence.).  
 115.  Korea Fair Trade Commission Appoints New Chairman, KIM & CHANG: NEWS & 
UPDATES (Jul. 30, 2009),  http://www.kimchang.com/UserFiles/files/NewsandUpdates-Kor
eanCompetitionLawandPolicy(090730).pdf [https://perma.cc/4RFM-AB8A]. Chung in a 
press interview “emphasized that the KFTC must focus its policies on creating a market 
economy that is up to global standards, and added that the Commission needs to be able to 
smoothly mediate possible conflicts between governmental industrial policies and antitrust 
law.” Id. 
 116.  Pres. Lee conducts reshuffle of Cabinet, presidential office, THE DONG-A ILBO (Jan. 
1, 2011), http://english.donga.com/List/3/all/26/400329/1 [https://perma.cc/V324-L9BJ]. 
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National Champions 
The FTC Act’s called-for consideration of the public interest prior to 
initiation of a proceeding and the MRFTA’s tolerance of unfair collaborative 
acts conducted in the public interest, e.g. for the overcoming of economic 
depression, reflect the same root concept: antitrust enforcement, or a 
purposeful lack thereof, as a governmental means to societal ends.  Within 
numerous countries, including South Korea, where some semblance of 
“corporatocracy” is condoned by the government, the common denominator 
of the public interest with respect to competition policy does not necessarily 
equate to lower consumer prices.  Great expectations for national champions 
and the trickle-down benefits of their success in international competition 
can and have overshadowed immediate regard for domestic consumer 
welfare.117  Mercantilist directives only exacerbate the overriding focus on 
top-heavy economic growth.  Whereas the consumer is paramount in the 
liberal economic model, mercantilists are more concerned with the 
production side,118 an inclination which explains their typical reticence 
toward strong antitrust policies. 
The writing had already been on the wall for Seoul’s new regulatory 
direction with Chairman Baek’s appointment and his ensuing pro-business 
announcements at President Lee’s behest, and it gained momentum as the 
worldwide recession worsened.  In January 2009, Baek made an 
unprecedented declaration that the MRFTA’s exemptions in the public 
 
 117.  See HWANG LEE, DEVELOPMENT OF COMPETITION LAWS IN KOREA 16 (ERIA 
Discussion Paper Series, 2015) (“The importance of national champions (that may be able to 
spread positive effect[s] on the domestic economy) and international competitiveness have 
been emphasi[z]ed in many Asian countries, including Korea, in this age of global 
competition.  While such theories have valid aspects, from a competition policy perspective, 
they can be dangerous. It is doubtful whether a national champion that is created and grown 
without active competition is sustainable in the long run.  If domestic consumer welfare is 
sacrificed in pursuit of industrial policies, the benefits and disadvantages must be closely 
evaluated and compared.  In Korea, recent studies show that the trickle-down effect of large 
conglomerates has drastically decreased and that the benefit of growth largely remains within 
large conglomerates.  Hence, the effects of industrial policies differ in each stage of economic 
development, and the countermeasures need to change along with them.”).  See also generally 
LI-WEN LIN & CURTIS J. MILHAUPT, We are the (National) Champions: Understanding the 
Mechanisms of State Capitalism in China, 65 STAN. L. REV. 697, 746 (2013) (“[N]ational 
champions represent much more than a purely financial investment for the party-state. 
SASAC, as the organizational manifestation of the party-state in its role as controlling 
shareholder, seeks to maximize a range of benefits extending from state revenues to 
technological prowess and from soft power abroad to regime survival at home . . . Of course, 
the country’s interests are defined by and consistent with the interests of the managerial elites 
that play key roles in the operation and evolution of the system.”).   
 118.  See, e.g., Rodrik, supra note 93 (stating that mercantilists rely on a “sound 
production structure”). 
NAM_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 9/27/2018  3:21 PM 
238 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 20.1 
 
interest for certain “unfair collaborative acts” were in effect despite none 
having been explicitly granted up until that point; global law firms jumped 
to report the news and its transnational implications for their practices.119  
This regulatory green light further empowered chaebol, many of which 
already featured questionable corporate governance mechanisms such as 
pyramidal share ownership.  According to the 2008 annual KFTC report on 
owner share structure, the controlling families of the 28 largest privately 
owned South Korean conglomerates held, on average, 49.3 percent of voting 
rights but only 14.2 percent of the stock.120  2008 was both the year of 
President Lee’s inauguration and the report’s final year of publication; KFTC 
compilations of data readily usable by chaebol critics did not serve the Lee 
administration’s interests. 
International as well as domestic media outlets, on the other hand, 
proceeded to highlight recurring patterns of Seoul’s generosity toward the 
mega-conglomerates in antitrust enforcement matters.  In February 2012, 
The Economist reported that the KFTC had “detected over 3,500 cases of 
price-fixing in 2010, but only 66 led to fines.  The average penalty amounted 
to just 2.3% of unfairly earned revenue.”121  While major chaebol Samsung 
and LG were targeted for fixing the prices of notebook PCs and flat-screen 
TVs from June 2008 to September 2009, Samsung received a scant $23 
million fine while LG’s lesser penalty was waived under the KFTC’s 
leniency program; incidentally, it was the third time in a two-year span that 
both conglomerates had chosen to price-fix and risk a regulator response.122  
According to a follow-up report from late 2012, “chaebol engaged in more 
than two-thirds of 76 business categories in South Korea . . . Between 
January and June, the operating profits of the ten accounted for more than 
70% of the profits of all the companies listed on the Korea Exchange.”123  In 
 
 119.  See Shinya Watanabe & Peter J. Wang, Antitrust Alert: Korea Considers Antitrust 
Exemptions for Certain Cartels to Assist Economic Recovery, JONES DAY (Jan. 2009), 
http://www.jonesday.com/antitrust-alert—korea-considers-antitrust-exemptions-for-certain-
cartels-to-assist-economic-recovery-01-05-2009/ [https://perma.cc/R8RZ-5H8Q] (“In an 
effort to aid the country’s recovery from economic crisis, the Chairman of the Korea Fair 
Trade Commission (KFTC) reportedly has announced that the KFTC may invoke its power 
to exempt certain cartels from the Korea antitrust laws, so long as the cartels do not engage 
in ‘direct price fixing.’  The Korea Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (MRFTA) and 
a Presidential Decree have authorized such exemptions, but so far none [have ever] been 
granted . . . Nevertheless, such exemptions would protect cartel members from liability only 
under Korean law. Therefore, the risk of antitrust liability elsewhere remains—including civil 
and criminal liability in the United States.”). 
 120.  Witt, supra note 24, at 220. 
 121.  Let Them Eat Cake; Bakers and Chaebol in South Korea, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 4, 
2012 at 71. 
 122.  Id. 
 123.  Bashing the Big Guys; Presidential Politics in South Korea, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 
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2011, the major national newspaper Hankook Ilbo stated that the agency was 
“quickly developing an ‘all bark and no bite’ reputation.”124  From January 
2011 to September 2014, the KFTC successfully pursued a single case of 
abuse of market dominance that resulted in corrective orders and fines, 
compared to thirty-eight successful cases in 2007.125 
The MRFTA’s elastic mandate, as exhibited in its arbitrary exemptions 
for “unfair collaborative acts” deemed to further the public interest, did not 
impede these lax enforcement patterns.  Nor could non-governmental actors 
exert meaningful pushback beyond drawing attention to the trend.126  In a 
familiar narrative for state-sponsored capitalist economies, top-down 
economic oversight absent polycentric consultation and consensus-building 
marginalized the input of a normally vibrant Korean civil society.127  The 
chaebol enjoyed a mercantilist focus on the “peculiar economic interests” of 
elites and social subgroups that could benefit the nation-state’s 
macroeconomic performance—a far cry from liberalism’s traditional 
emphasis on the individual, and global welfare by extension.128  Subsumed 
under Lee’s pro-chaebol agenda, the KFTC proved as rudderless as the 
deferential early incarnations of the FTC. 
 
13, 2012 at 49. 
 124.  Kim Yoo-chul, FTC Chief Acts as if Twain’s Man with Hammer, THE KOREA TIMES 
(Nov. 21, 2011), http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinon/2016/05/264_99184.html 
[https://perma.cc/J9DH-8E7C]. 
 125.  Hwang Lee, Overview of Current Antitrust Enforcement in Korea, COMPETITION 
POL’Y INT’L (Sept. 12, 2014), https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/assets/
Uploads/AsiaSept2014-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/M3VP-KQHW] (“Since the 2009 Qualcomm 
and Intel cases that involved loyalty rebate practices, we haven’t seen many notable cases of 
abuse of market dominance.  In fact, since 2011 until today, the KFTC has been successful in 
only one case about hindering kiwi fruit distribution to impose corrective orders and fines of 
half a million USD.  This is a dramatic decline compared to the 38 successful cases pursued 
in the sole year of 2007.  Many experts are concerned with this trend pointing [out] that it may 
undermine the reputation of the KFTC as the guard of sound market competition.”). 
 126.  See, e.g., Anti-trust Trade Commission Unveils Plan to Ease Regulations for 
Conglomerates, supra note 2 (“In response, a civic organization accused the FTC of virtually 
giving up its role as the ‘guardian of the market economy’ to focus on the corporate-friendly 
policies of the administration of President Lee Myung-Bak . . . Kim Jin-bang, a senior activist 
with the People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy and a professor at Inha University, 
blamed the FTC for ‘Its plan to ease regulations, despite a lack of plans for supervisions and 
punishments, which shows that (the FTC) may sit idly by if the market collapses.’ ”). 
 127. See Witt, supra note 24, at 219 (stating that the large conglomerates comprise “the 
major non-state actor[s] in economic policy-making.”). Though meaningful “civil regulation” 
of conglomerates has yet to coalesce in East Asian states such as South Korea and Japan, it 
may be latent given the historical potency of “people power” in their national politics. See 
generally Kyu Hyun Kim, The Age of Visions and Arguments: Parliamentarianism and the 
National Public Sphere in Early Meiji Japan (2007); Kuk Cho, Transitional Justice in Korea: 
Legally Coping with Past Wrongs after Democratization, 16 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 579 
(2007).  
 128.  See Gilpin, supra note 21, at 283. 
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C. Regulator Bias against Foreign Firms and Competitors 
The U.S.’ rise atop the liberal international order coincided with Great 
Britain’s early twentieth century decline, but also was precipitated by a 
culture of free investment that resisted strong financial institutional sway and 
social democratic interferences in the public firm.  The Gilded Age’s 
exponential industrial expansion, dependent on a small number of powerful 
trusts, gave way to large public firms with diffuse ownership and frequent 
differences in opinion between shareholders and managers.129  Their eventual 
prevalence and sophistication largely spared U.S. antitrust regulators of 
concerns over the national economic consequences that discrete enforcement 
action or inaction against any one firm might trigger.  In contrast, 
competition authorities in countries that were slower to industrialize and/or 
operate within a more coordinated variety of capitalism have had to contend 
with the national ramifications of penalizing national champions, many of 
them controlled by dominant families.  Mercantilist political pressures can 
further obfuscate regulator responsibilities within the interdependent global 
economy.130  Per Gilpin: 
Nation-states are induced to enter the international system because 
of the promise of more rapid growth; greater benefits can be had 
than could be obtained by autarky or a fragmentation of the world 
economy. The historical record suggests, however, that the 
existence of mutual economic benefits is not always enough to 
induce nations to pay the costs of a market system or to forgo 
opportunities of advancing their own interests at the expense of 
others.  There is always the danger that a nation may pursue certain 
short-range policies. . . . in order to maximize its own gains at the 
expense of the system as a whole.131 
The KFTC’s 2007-2009 investigation into the U.S. semiconductor and 
telecommunications firm Qualcomm for abuse of market dominance132—
 
 129.  See generally Mark J. Roe, Political Preconditions to Separating Ownership from 
Corporate Control, 53 STAN. L. REV. 539 (2000) (describing how the political environment 
of the United States encouraged the rise of public firms in the early twentieth century).  
 130.   
The mercantilist model can be derided as state capitalism or cronyism. But when 
it works, as it has so often in Asia, the model’s ‘government-business 
collaboration’ or ‘pro-business state’ quickly garners heavy praise. . . . Even in 
Britain, classical liberalism arrived only in the mid-nineteenth century — that is, 
after the country had become the world’s dominant industrial power. 
       Rodrik, supra note 93. 
 131.  Gilpin, supra note 21, at 290. 
 132.  For an English-language official summary of the resultant KFTC decision, see 
generally KOREAN FAIR TRADE COMM’N [KFTC], DECISION NO. 2009-281, QUALCOMM’S 
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which culminated in a then-record agency fine of $208 million for a single 
company133—exemplified the workings of the Lee Myung-Bak 
administration’s short-range antitrust policy at the free market’s expense.  
The KFTC concluded in July 2009 that Qualcomm had violated Korean law 
by charging discriminatorily higher royalties for usage of non-Qualcomm 
chips by mobile handset makers that had been licensed its technology, 
implementing discounts and rebates towards purchase of its CDMA chipsets, 
and continuing to require 50 percent royalty payments following the 
expiration of licensed patents.134  However, Qualcomm’s licensing deals had 
long been public knowledge, as was the company’s preferential treatment of 
certain licensees, such as Nokia, which received special terms in 2008 as part 
of a new agreement.135  The KFTC itself pointed out that “Qualcomm was 
able to maintain its high market share close to a monopoly for more than a 
decade.”136  Hence the timing of the agency’s hammer, given longstanding 
public knowledge of Qualcomm’s marketing practices and its 98 percent 
market share of the Korean CDMA modem chip market since 2002, attracted 
due criticism. 
The MRFTA was a willing straw man in its latitude with respect to 
presidential determination of categories and standards for abusive market-
dominating acts, and its imprecise statutory guidance suited the KFTC.  The 
agency found market dominance abuse under Section 3-2, specifically “acts 
of unreasonably interfering with business activities of other entrepreneurs” 
and “acts of unfairly excluding competing entrepreneurs,” as well as unfair 
business practices under Section 23 (“acts of unfairly taking advantage of its 
position in the business area”).137  In assessing the applicability of these 
 
ABUSE OF DOMINANCE (2012) http://www.ftc.go.kr/eng/bbs.do?command=getList&typ
e_cd=54&pageId=0302 [https://perma.cc/8LVC-4Z7R] (explaining Qualcomm corporation’s 
anti-competitive behaviors and analyzing the commission’s decision on the case).  
 133.  Id. at 23. See also S. Korea fines Qualcomm $208 mln in anti-trust case, REUTERS 
(Jul. 23, 2009), http://www.reuters.com/article/qualcomm-korea/update-2-s-korea-fines-
qualcomm-208-mln-in-anti-trust-case-idUSSEO19318620090723 [https://perma.cc/55ZM-
96WA].  
 134.  Id. at 1. 
     135.  Scott Moritz, Qualcomm plays favorites with Nokia, FORTUNE (Jul. 24, 2008, 4:54 
PM), http://archive.fortune.com/2008/07/24/technology/qualcomm-royalty.fortne/index.htm 
[https://perma.cc/NT7R-AZYR] (“Analysts estimate the new deal with Nokia trims that 
royalty rate in half to 2% or lower. . . For more than a decade, the San Diego-based tech giant 
has successfully leveraged its claims to some basic technology in wireless networks and 
phones into lucrative licensing deal. . . [P]hone makers have to shell out an estimated 4.5% 
payment to Qualcomm for each phone sold.) 
 136.  Press Release, Korea Fair Trade Comm., Qualcomm’s Abuse of Market Dominance 
3 (Jul. 23, 2009) http://www.ftc.go.kr/eng/bbs.do?command=getList&type_cd=52&pag
eId=0305 [https://perma.cc/4RFX-YNQR]. 
 137.  See MRFTA, supra note 87 and accompanying text; Lee, supra note 132, at 9; 
MRFTA, Act No. 3320, Dec. 31, 1980, art. 3-2, 23 (S. Kor.). 
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Articles’ standards for unreasonableness, unfairness, discrimination, and 
considerable harm, the KFTC cited a battery of the U.S. case law and analytic 
tests used in the U.S. and EU courts.  The agency conceded “intense debate” 
over loyalty rebates138 and noted clashes even between the DOJ and the 
FTC.139  A Seoul industry watcher had earlier observed that “[c]ompanies 
here have constantly complained about Qualcomm demanding too much 
royalty . . . The investigation can be seen as political pressure on Qualcomm 
to be more friendly [sic] toward South Korean companies which use its 
technology.”140  In retrospect, a U.S.-based observer was harsher in his 
assessment that the KFTC had “run amok in recent years, slapping spurious 
charges on foreign companies as it attempts to execute a protectionist 
agenda,” naming Qualcomm among a list of foreign targets for Korean 
regulator bias that included Apple, Google, Microsoft, and Intel.141 
Prior to its record Qualcomm judgment, the KFTC fined Intel $25.4 
million in June 2008 for rebate incentive schemes offered to Samsung and 
other South Korean PC manufacturers as far back as 2001 in exchange for 
their agreement not to purchase from Intel’s rival Advanced Micro Devices 
 
 138.  Lee, supra note 132, at 16 (The Le[P]age case is the most recent among others 
involving multi-product bundled rebate[s] and was subject to a fierce dispute. The Third 
Circuit Court’s decision in favor of the plaintiff is still under intense debate. The court’s 
decision was criticized for being based on insufficient evidences and unclear justifications on 
the undermining competition as well as neglecting the price-cost safe harbor for assessing 
illegality of price discounts, which had been established as [an] appropriate pricing test since 
Brooke.) 
 139.  Id. at 17 (“In the Single Firm Conduct Report released in September 2008, the DOJ 
placed a focus on whether exclusive dealing contributes to maintaining monopoly, and, if so, 
it stated, such excusive (sic) conduct could be regulated only if its harm greatly outweighed 
the consumer benefits. It also said exclusive dealing affecting less than a 30% market share 
was considered to be in safe harbor. It took a similar approach to bundled discount[s]. 
According to the report, bundled discounting should only be condemned based on 
consideration of, among others, whether rivals remain or are likely to remain in the market, 
or anticompetitive effects from bundled discount[s] are substantially disproportionate to the 
benefits. When it comes to single-product loyalty rebates, it cast a doubt on the concept of 
contestability or measurement of efficient scale, and concluded that it would be appropriate 
to apply the predator pricing approach to single-product loyalty discounts. In response to the 
DOJ Report, FTC Commissioners Harbour, Leibowitz and Rosch strongly criticized [it 
because] the focus on the price-cost safe harbor and whether rivals remain in a market could 
inhibit rival companies from securing the ‘minimum viable scale,’ leaving unchecked the 
abuse of monopoly power by a monopolist. In May 2009, the DOJ withdrew the report.”) 
 140.  Choe Sang-Hun, Qualcomm Under Scrutiny by Korean Antitrust Agency, THE NEW 
YORK TIMES, Jan. 3, 2007, at C4. 
 141.  Roger Kay, South Korea at a Crossroads, FORBES (June 2, 2015, 9:30 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/rogerkay/2015/06/22/south-korea-at-a-crossroads 
[https://perma.cc/UN65-FVHG] (noting that “[a]n increasing proportion of these decisions 
have been overturned in South Korean courts, an independent judiciary that has tended to 
weigh cases on their merits.”). 
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(“AMD”).142  Such a “time-honored” practice within the industry143 did not 
dissuade the KFTC from turning to its MRFTA Article 3-2 canvas and to a 
linked Presidential Decree.  The agency asserted that Intel had violated 
Article 3-2 by unfairly excluding competitive enterprisers or doing 
considerable harm to the interest of consumers,144 previewing its approach to 
be used a year later against Qualcomm.  With Intel, the KFTC went a step 
further and also cited a related Presidential Decree clause which describes 
one manner of competitor exclusion as a situation “[w]here the business is 
done on the condition that business partners do not trade with business 
rivals.”145  Intel, for its part, argued that the rebates did not violate the spirit 
of the preceding clause (“[w]here goods or services supplied at lower prices 
than normally trading prices or goods or services purchased at higher prices 
than normally trading prices are feared to put business rivals out of the 
business”)146; according to its submitted economic methodology, an effective 
price test using a commercially viable share (“CVS”), the rebates had not 
resulted in unreasonably low prices due to effective price being significantly 
higher than the average cost.147  In response, the KFTC determined that 
competitor exclusion could transpire if certain assumptions in Intel’s 
methodology were tweaked—specifically, the percentages for CVS and the 
non-conditional rebate rate.148  An official summary of the decision did 
contain the following caveat: 
Internationally, the U.S. takes a relatively generous position about 
loyalty rebate although different from one court to another. The EU and 
 
 142.  For an English-language official summary of the KFTC decision, see KFTC, 
DECISION NO. 2008-295, INTEL’S ABUSE OF DOMINANCE (2008) http://www.ftc.go.kr/eng/bbs. 
do?command=getList&type_cd=54&pageId=0302 [https://perma.cc/32QR-QRVM] 
(discussing a case involving Intel’s exclusive dealing as illustrated by the company’s loyalty 
rebates and analyzing the commission’s decision on the case). 
 143.  Shu-Ching Jean Chen, Korean Watchdog Says Intel Doesn’t Play Fair, FORBES (June 
5, 2008, 12:04 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2008/06/05/intel-korea-antitrust-markets-equity-
cx_jc_0605markets03.html [https://perma.cc/7XWL-543E]. 
 144.  KFTC, supra note 142, at 6. 
 145.  Enforcement Decree of the MRFTA, Presidential Decree No. 12979, Apr. 14, 1990, 
art. 5-5(2) (S. Kor.). 
 146.  Id. at art. 5-5(1). 
 147.  KFTC, DECISION NO. 2008-295, INTEL’S ABUSE OF MARKET DOMINANCE IN KOREA, 
translated by Byung-Geon Lee, American Antitrust Institute, 2009, http://www.antit
rustinstitute.org/files/aai-%20Intel%20KFTC%20summary%203-12-09_031220091229.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MSW6-MFCC]. 
 148.  Id. For a closer look at the effective price test using a commercially viable share, see 
GUNNAR NIELS ET. AL., ECONOMICS FOR COMPETITION LAWYERS 233-234 (2d ed. 2011) (“as 
efficient competitor analysis in Intel shows both the strengths and weaknesses of this test in 
loyalty rebates—it has the advantage of generating clear thresholds according to a specified 
formula, but the disadvantage is that the numbers cannot be relied upon unless you are 
comfortable with the assumptions behind them.”). 
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Korea are rather strict. Japan has no surcharge provisions on the relevant 
violation and imposes relatively lenient corrective measures. Given this, the 
court’s ruling on this Case will have the great significance as a precedent.149 
However, even in the EU, the legal debate over Intel’s rebates has 
dragged on.  As recently as October 2016, EU Advocate General Nils Wahl 
rebuked a European General Court for failing to establish an anticompetitive 
foreclosure effect.150 
With respect to the rebates, the KFTC proved to be an outlier.  Having 
recognized that the MRFTA is “silent on the criteria for determining the 
unreasonableness of exclusive dealing,”151 the agency under the Lee 
administration deferentially exercised its discretion in line with Seoul’s over-
arching economic policy of the period.  Partiality towards domestic 
companies over their competitors necessitated a divergent legal stance, and 
the Korean competition regime could do little but oblige. 
CONCLUSION 
National antitrust silos are not a novel phenomenon.  Former European 
Commissioner for Competition Joaquín Almunia warned of them years 
ago,152 and scholarship touching upon the furtherance of nationalist goals by 
 
 149.  KFTC, supra note 142, at 16. 
 150.  Court of Justice of the European Union Press Release No 114/16, Advocate General 
Wahl considers that Intel’s appeal against the imposition of a €1.06 billion fine for abuse of 
its dominant position should be upheld (Oct. 20, 2016), http://curia.europa.eu/j
cms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2016-10/cp160114en.pdf [https://perma.cc/6LHT-2CMK]. 
The press release continued to state: 
[t]he Advocate General therefore concludes that the General Court erred in 
finding that ‘exclusivity rebates’ constitute a separate and unique category of 
rebates that require no consideration of all the circumstances in order to establish 
an abuse of dominant position.  In addition, the Advocate General goes on to 
determine that the General Court erred in law in its alternative assessment of 
capability by failing to establish, on the basis of all the circumstances, that the 
rebates and payments offered by the appellant had, in all likelihood, an anti-
competitive foreclosure effect. 
Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 151.  KFTC, supra note 142, at 7. 
 152.  Almunia, supra note 3. Almunia went on to state: 
[f]rom our perspective as enforcers: we need to be able to bring cases which 
involve companies and behaviours that cut across multiple jurisdictions. This 
requires practical cooperation between our agencies but also a degree of 
convergence between our policies.  And it is also true from the perspective of 
businesses: cooperation and convergence contribute to a level playing field across 
jurisdictions, increase legal predictability by reducing the risk of incoherent 
intervention, and ultimately facilitate cross-border trade and investments to the 
benefit of our economies.  Of course, we all necessarily operate in the context of 
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various antitrust agencies dates back decades.153  However, a creeping loss 
of public confidence in open markets—coupled with the obstacles to 
coherent global antitrust enforcement that bear the FTC Act’s influence, as 
illustrated in this Article—risks amplifying the problem.  As anti-free trade 
agendas continue to garner more mainstream popularity for formerly 
counter-establishment parties, a proliferation of protectionist silos could 
tempt even governments that, for the most part, had moved past them.  Why, 
American officials may ask, should the U.S. continue championing the 
liberal international economic order when an illiberal China or an ostensibly 
liberal South Korea bends regulatory rules to disadvantage American 
companies, workers, and consumers?  Skepticism towards a liberal 
democratic “end of history”154 in general, and failures of economic liberalism 
in particular, are threatening to motivate political circles accordingly.  Even 
perennial norms and conventions of the U.S. competition regime which 
evolved to safeguard regulator independence at home are no longer above 
disruption; the ambiguous statutory articulations that carried over abroad to 
empower strong executives are likewise playing a paper tiger role 
domestically of late.155 
Protectionist policies designed to compromise market competition—for 
all its documented excesses and inadequacies—would sap its creative vitality 
 
our own market conditions, our own competition laws and our own procedures. 
The parameters of our cooperation are defined by this fact. In terms of substantive 
assessment, we have to recognise that each case is necessarily shaped by these 
specificities — but this should not stop us working towards common principles, 
built upon a sound economic analysis.  
Id. 
 153.  See, e.g., Cushman, supra note 16 (discussing the impact of presidential policies on 
agencies in a 1941 publication);  
[U]pon examining the policies behind the antitrust laws of South Korea and Japan 
and looking at the overall state of the economy of these countries since the 
enactment of their antitrust laws, one would be hard pressed not to acknowledge 
that they have also been successful. Their success, however, has not been in the 
form of implementing their antitrust measures. Rather, it has been in achieving 
the objectives behind their antitrust laws—the growth of their economies. 
Abir, supra note 31, at 175. 
 154.  Contrary to popular belief, Francis Fukuyama’s thesis did not imply a world free of 
conflict. See Francis Fukuyama, The End of History, 16 NATIONAL INTEREST 1, 3-18 (1989) 
(arguing that the passing of Marxism-Leninism worldwide would lead to a disappearance of 
ideological struggles and a decline of large-scale conflicts between states). 
 155.  See, e.g., Josh Boak, Trump’s CEO meetings raise ethics questions, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS (Jan. 14, 2017), https://www.apnews.com/7d256125f53643fbb20e4be2bc993a2b 
[https://perma.cc/C94Q-YME9] (reporting that Trump’s meetings with CEOs regarding the 
potential mergers of their companies demonstrate a compromised position of the 
administration’s regulatory agency). 
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and the concurrent liberal peace156 often taken for granted.  Economic 
liberalism ails not so much from the intrinsic failings of core tenets, but from 
their more egregious nation-state and corporate violators.  Proposals for 
greater accountability and harmonization have ranged from presumption of 
an underlying coordination scheme in antitrust investigations of a culpable 
country’s companies,157 to an international competition regime binding on 
member states in at least some areas of antitrust.158  Each has associated costs, 
but their very debate harnesses polycentric dialogue lacking in nationalist 
regulatory agendas and calls for “our country, right or wrong” protectionist 
silos.  It should be emphasized to policymakers and politicians collectively 
that lasting convergence in antitrust enforcement is unachievable without 
global coherence in regulator autonomy, and the FTC Act’s formative 
influence is not above scrutiny or reproach.  Still-elusive realization of the 
liberal economic international order’s intended form will require an 
expanded constellation of independent competition regulators empowered to 
enforce antitrust laws consistently. 
 
 
 156.  Doyle’s characterization of Schumpeter’s philosophy is insightful here.  
According to Schumpeter (1955:68), when the people’s energies are daily 
absorbed in production, ‘economic rationalism,’ or the instability of market 
competition, necessitates calculation. It also ‘individualizes’ as ‘subjective 
opportunities’ replace the ‘immutable factors’ of traditional hierarchical society. 
Rational individuals then demand democratic governance . . . Democratic 
capitalism means free trade and a peaceful foreign policy simply because they 
are, Schumpeter claimed, the first best solutions for rational majorities in 
capitalist societies. This is the heart of the contemporary enthusiasm, expressed 
by many liberal politicians, for global democratization and capitalism as the 
inevitable and pacific routes to peace . . .  
Doyle, supra note 20, at 67. 
 157.  See generally Nicolas Petit, Chinese State Capitalism and Western Antitrust Policy, 
4 CONCURRENCES 69 (2016) (arguing that China’s state-led economic organization facilitates 
antitrust problems).  
 158.  See generally John O. McGinnis, The Political Economy of International Antitrust 
Harmonization, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 549 (2003) (criticizing harmonization of 
international antitrust laws and arguing for diversification and decentralization as an 
alternative). 
